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Why Thomas Harriot was not the English Galileo 
[Published in: Robert Fox (ed.), Thomas Harriot: Mathematics, Exploration, and 
Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 113-37.] 
 
Introduction 
Beginning with Baron von Zach (1754–1832) in the eighteenth century, Harriot has 
been seen as an English Galileo. Reaffirmed in the late twentieth century by Jean 
Jacquot and other devotees of Harriot, this claim has most recently been defended by 
Matthias Schemmel.
1
 It is important to note, before going any further, that in many 
respects this claim is entirely justifiable. The title of English Galileo is based on 
Harriot’s independent discovery of the parabolic trajectory of projectiles; studies of 
impact and force of percussion or collision which approached closer to the classical 
solution than Galileo managed; and the independent manufacture and use of telescopes 
to observe the surface of the moon, and the phenomena of sunspots before Galileo.
2
 
Like Galileo, he also tried to develop an atomistic theory of matter, although for 
different reasons—in Galileo’s case, atomism was used chiefly as a means of explaining 
cohesion and the difference between liquid and solid states, while Harriot seems to have 
regarded atomism as the best system to explain condensation and rarefaction, specific 
weights, and optical refraction.
3
   
Furthermore, Harriot can also be compared with other great figures in the 
history of science. Take René Descartes, for example. Descartes has a claim to being the 
independent discoverer in optics of the law of refraction which is now known as Snell’s 
law (after Willebrord Snell)—but Harriot beat both Snell and Descartes to it.4 It is also 
arguable that Harriot not Descartes should be credited with the invention of the 
algebraic technique of shifting all the terms of an equation to the left hand side and 
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making them equal to zero.
5
 Evidence that Harriot denied the principle of celestial 
circularity, and dared to believe that planets might not move in perfect circles, even 
before the appearance of Kepler’s Astronomia nova in 1609, has led to an honourable 
mention as the English Kepler. In what follows, therefore, we will occasionally 
compare Harriot to Descartes and Kepler, as well as to Galileo.
6
 
In spite of the undeniable similarities between the work of Harriot and these 
most eminent of his contemporaries in the history of science, however, I want to reject 
suggestions that he was, to stick to my title for now, an English Galileo. It is important 
to state at the outset, however, that this paper is not concerned to deny, much less refute, 
all earlier claims that have pointed to the undeniable similarities between the work and 
intellectual achievements of Galileo and Harriot. This is not, therefore, intended to be a 
refutation of Dr Schemmel’s work, for example. Dr Schemmel has concentrated on 
Harriot’s mathematical work and its similarities to Galileo’s mathematical work—the 
validity and the value of this work is not in dispute in what follows. This paper merely 
seeks to make a more general historical point, which has important historiographical 
implications, about the considerable differences between Harriot and Galileo.
7
 In part, 
my aim in exposing these crucial differences is to explain why, for all his astonishing 
genius, Harriot failed, in the judgement of history, to scale the heights that Galileo did. 
My denial that Harriot was an English Galileo should not be seen, therefore, as an 
attempt to belittle this great English thinker, but as an attempt to explain why so often he 
did not capitalize on his innovations and achievements. 
Before I begin give my own reasons for denying that Harriot was an alternative 
Galileo, it is perhaps worth pointing to another denial based on very different grounds. 
Stephen Pumfrey has recently pointed to the very real differences in the situations of 
Galileo and Harriot as a result of the different styles of patronage they received.
8
 These 
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differences were so great, Pumfrey argues, that it had a very real bearing on the final 
achievement of both men, and resulted in Harriot being Harriot, and Galileo, and only 
Galileo, being Galileo.  
Although Galileo began his career as a professor of mathematics at the 
university of Pisa, and subsequently at Padua, after the publication of his sensational 
Siderius Nuncius, he seized the opportunity to ingratiate himself with Cosimo II, 
Grand-duke of Tuscany, and remained a leading figure in Cosimo’s court until his fall 
from grace in 1633. His role at court was to advance Cosimo and the Medici in their 
cultural rivalry with the courts of neighbouring city states, including the Papal court in 
Rome. Accordingly, Galileo had to be ostentatious, producing work that would make a 
big noise through the republic of letters; making his own name, and simultaneously 
enhancing that of his patron.
9
 
It was very different in Elizabethan England. Once Harriot left the employ of his 
first patron, Sir Walter Ralegh, whose demands on Harriot’s expertise were almost 
entirely pragmatic, and became, from about 1595, the pensioner of Henry Percy, Ninth 
Earl of Northumberland, there was perhaps some expectation that Harriot would 
enhance the reputation of the Wizard Earl, but it was clearly a far cry from the demands 
on Galileo as courtier.
10
 For one thing, Henry Percy was a courtier himself, serving his 
monarch, and was not involved in the same kind of rivalry with fellow courtiers as 
Cosimo was with neighbouring princes. Percy was involved in a rivalry for the 
monarch’s favour, not for his own aggrandizement. Furthermore, it followed from their 
markedly different positions in their respective political hierarchies, that Cosimo and 
Percy did not have the same motivation for supporting these two mathematicians. 
Unlike Cosimo, Percy was genuinely interested in the work of his so-called three magi, 
Harriot, Walter Warner and Robert Hues. He shared their passion for an understanding 
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of the natural world. Again, this meant that Harriot’s work did not need to be played out 
so publicly as Galileo’s. Cosimo had no use for a hermit-like scholar, burning his light 
under a bushel, but Percy seems to have felt well satisfied by a few days spent with 
Warner or Harriot performing a fruitless series of alchemical manipulations, or trying to 
learn how to solve various problems using the latest algebraic techniques.
11
 Galileo had 
to produce work which would have a high impact, sending out shock waves through the 
republic of letters. Harriot, who already enjoyed the intellectual engagement of his 
patron, could afford to be ‘contented with a private life for the love of learning that I 
might study freely.’12 
Another difference between the situations of Galileo and Harriot hinged upon 
what Pumfrey calls connectivity. It would have been an easy matter for Galileo to find 
another patron, either in a neighbouring Italian state, or perhaps at the Habsburg court in 
Prague. This meant that a man like Galileo could maintain some leverage over his 
patron, ensuring at least some means of maintaining conditions at court that suited him. 
In England there were few opportunities and a man like Harriot, who was generously 
retained, had to consider himself lucky. Even John Dee, after all, never found a similar 
permanent position in England. He was commissioned by Elizabeth for various tasks, 
but never succeeded in persuading her to make him her court magus. His only recourse 
was to take up offers of patronage on the Continent—a move which then made him 
suspect back in England. Harriot did try to find favour with other possible patrons, 
notably Robert Cecil, Lord Salisbury, and even the young Prince of Wales, Henry, but 
they died before they could do Harriot any real good. What this meant, then, was that 
Harriot was never able to break free of the somewhat baleful influence upon him of the 
reputations of his two successive patrons, Ralegh and Percy. The historical jury is still 
out, pondering whether Harriot was an atheist or not, but the contemporary jury found 
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him guilty. A substantial portion of his guilt seems to have been acquired by 
association. If Harriot’s reputation for impiety, or for political chicanery, were not of his 
own making, he could do nothing to dissociate himself from those who were to blame, 
because of the difficulties of finding patrons in England.
13
 In that sense, then, Harriot 
was in a worse position than Galileo—whose troubles with the Church were largely of 
his own making.
14
 
There can be no doubt, then, that differences in the nature of their patronage, 
stemming either from the socio-political differences in the nature of patronage in early 
seventeenth-century Tuscany and England, or from the personal differences and 
demands of their respective patrons, ensured that Harriot and Galileo marched to the 
beat of different drums, and this very much affected their output of work. I entirely 
endorse Pumfrey’s claim, therefore, that our understanding of the nature of patronage as 
it affected the careers of both men is extremely important and helps us to see why, in 
spite of so many might-have-beens, Harriot did not achieve what Galileo did, and did 
not become the English Galileo. Or, rather, perhaps we should say that Harriot’s failure 
to rush his telescopic observations of the moon, or of sunspots, into print meant that 
Galileo is not now routinely described as the Italian Harriot. 
 
I believe that there is yet more to be said on this matter, however. I believe there is 
another significant reason why Harriot cannot seriously be regarded as an English 
Galileo. And it is this aspect of Harriot and his work which I want to focus on for the rest 
of this essay. I can bring to the fore just what this is by reminding you of a famous aspect 
of Galileo’s negotiations with Belisario Vinta, Cosimo II’s Secretary of State, when he 
first arranged the terms of his appointment to the Ducal Court. ‘As to the title of my 
position,’ Galileo wrote, 
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I desire that in addition to the title of ‘mathematician’ His Highness will annex 
that of ‘philosopher’; for I may claim to have studied more years in [natural] 
philosophy than months in pure mathematics.
15
 
And so it was that Galileo became mathematician and philosopher to the Grand 
Duke of Tuscany. Galileo lived up to this title in a way that no contemporary could have 
foreseen. He was, of course, a leading figure in the transformation of natural philosophy 
into something much more recognisably like modern science, by amalgamating 
speculative natural philosophy with mathematical and experimental traditions. Thomas 
Harriot, however, always remained first and foremost a mathematical practitioner. 
While Galileo clearly wanted to be seen as a natural philosopher, the evidence suggests 
that Harriot always remained reluctant to venture into natural philosophy, and therefore, 
I submit, was unable to participate in its transformation into a new form of philosophy. 
So, what I must do now is to explain what I mean by this transformation of 
natural philosophy, in the course of which it was amalgamated with mathematical and 
experimental traditions. Only when we have a clear idea of shifting boundaries in the 
organization of knowledge in Harriot’s day can we see where Harriot’s work was 
located. I hope then that I will be able to persuade you finally that Harriot could not have 
been the English Galileo, because Galileo was a natural philosopher, albeit of a new 
breed, but Harriot never was. 
 
The separation between mathematics and natural philosophy in Harriot’s day 
There was a clear distinction still in force in the sixteenth century between natural 
philosophy, sometimes simply called physics, or physiologia, and the mathematical 
sciences. According to the Aristotelian precepts, natural philosophy was concerned with 
understanding the ‘why’ of things, and this required a knowledge of causes, how these 
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things came to be as they are. So, natural philosophy was concerned with causal 
narratives which not only identified the causes, but showed how the causes operated to 
bring about the state of affairs in question. Implicit, if not explicit, in this starting point 
was the assumption that natural philosophy dealt with sensible being, material bodies as 
they appeared to the senses, and this in turn marked natural philosophy out from 
mathematics, which considered quantitative being, and metaphysics, which dealt with 
being in itself, abstracted from any substantial instances of being.
16
 
Generally speaking, mathematics was seen as an ineffective way of pursuing 
natural philosophical enquiry. Mathematics could not provide the required causal 
accounts, but could only provide what amounted to a special kind of precisely detailed 
description. Analysis of the motion of the sphere of Mars, for example, could reveal that 
it must move on a large epicycle around a deferent, and could determine the required 
speeds of motion on both epicycle and deferent, the amount of eccentricity of the 
deferent relative to the Earth, and so on. It could not, however, offer any account of why 
Mars moved this way—of what caused these complicated movements.17 
Nevertheless, it was recognised that some mathematical sciences came close to 
the domain of natural philosophy, in so far as they dealt with real physical phenomena. 
Astronomy was one of these, as was music (the science of mathematical ratios, which 
clearly corresponded in some way to the physical harmonies heard in music), and 
optics, the geometrical study of the behaviour of light rays. These were designated in 
the Aristotelian tradition as scientiae mediae, or mixed sciences, because they used the 
principles of mathematics to understand what was taking place, but were part of physics 
because they dealt with sensible things. The mixed sciences were said to be 
subalternated to mathematics on the one hand, and to physics on the other, and there 
were endless scholastic debates as to which of the parent sciences dominated.
18
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Now, by the second half of the sixteenth century change was already taking 
place, and the mixed sciences were beginning to play a greater role in natural 
philosophy. In particular, a new scientia media, mechanics, was beginning to be 
included in discussions of motion in natural philosophy. Mechanics had previously been 
regarded as an art, rather than one of the mathematical sciences, because its purpose was 
entirely practical. But the Renaissance re-discovery of the Mechancial Problems, 
attributed to Aristotle (though admittedly never uncontroversially accepted as genuine), 
made the learned aware of the theoretical credentials of mechanics, and it was 
accordingly placed alongside the other mixed mathematical sciences. Although 
mechanics dealt chiefly with processes taking place in artificial set-ups, such as 
machines, and should therefore have been excluded from natural philosophy, which was 
supposed to deal with unforced, perfectly natural processes, it was occasionally 
introduced alongside discussions of projectile motion, which Aristotle had included in 
the Physics.
19
 
The increasing attention paid to the mathematical sciences in natural philosophy 
was due in no small measure to the efforts of a very wide range of different 
mathematicians to increase the intellectual status of their subject. There were 
mathematical humanists, recovering ancient mathematics, university mathematics 
teachers, and a wide range of mathematical practitioners, from elite architects and 
military engineers to more humble teachers and artisans, all of whom were trying to 
make a living from mathematics and, in many cases, to exploit the interconnected 
possibilities for patronage which existed on continental Europe, if not in England.
20
 
Nevertheless, there was a great deal of inertia in scholastic natural philosophy, and in 
the neighbouring disciplines, so there was still a great deal of separation between natural 
philosophers and mathematical practitioners.
21
 
 9 
The classic illustration of this, of course, is the preface added to Copernicus’s 
De revolutionibus orbium coelestium by the Lutheran minister who had been delegated 
to supervise it through the press, Andreas Osiander. Judging from the opening remark, 
Osiander had heard of objections to Copernicus’s approach to astronomy even before it 
was published, and sought to forestall them.
22
 Accordingly, and without asking for the 
author’s permission, he interpolated a page, before Copernicus’s own preface, which 
bore only Osiander’s unsigned preface: 
There have already been widespread reports about the novel 
hypotheses of this work, which declares that the earth moves 
whereas the sun is at rest in the center of the universe. Hence 
certain scholars, I have no doubt, are deeply offended and 
believe that the liberal arts, which were established long ago on a 
sound basis, should not be thrown into confusion. But if these 
men are willing to examine the matter closely, they will find that 
the author of this work has done nothing blameworthy. For it is 
the duty of an astronomer to compose the history of the celestial 
motions through careful and expert study. Then he must 
conceive and devise the causes of these motions or hypotheses 
about them. Since he cannot in any way attain to the true causes, 
he will adopt whatever suppositions enable the motions to be 
computed correctly from the principles of geometry for the 
future as well as for the past. The present author has performed 
both these duties excellently… For this art, it is quite clear, is 
completely and absolutely ignorant of the causes of the apparent 
nonuniform motions. And if any causes are devised by the 
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imagination, as indeed very many are, they are not put forward to 
convince anyone that they are true, but merely to provide a 
reliable basis for computation… 
… So far as hypotheses are concerned, let no one expect 
anything certain from astronomy, which cannot furnish it, lest he 
accepts as the truth ideas conceived for another purpose, and 
depart from this study a greater fool than when he entered it. 
Farewell.
23
 
As Robert S. Westman has pointed out, it is not the nature of the physical world 
which is in danger of being thrown into confusion by Copernicus’s heliocentric 
astronomy, but the liberal arts, to which astronomy has long since been allocated. To 
reassure his readers Osiander immediately reaffirms that the author is not saying 
anything about true causes—that is to say, he is not making any natural philosophical 
claims—but is merely considering hypothetical, we might say simply ‘mathematical’, 
constructs which enable us to correctly calculate planetary positions. Copernicus 
himself undoubtedly wanted to assert a new relationship between mathematics and 
natural philosophy, but Osiander has undercut his intentions by reaffirming the 
traditional boundary between natural philosophy and the subalternate mixed science of 
astronomy. ‘The upshot of Osiander’s skilfully argued Letter is striking’, Westman 
wrote, ‘in believing that he has demonstrated the astronomer’s inability to draw 
conclusions in natural philosophy, he denies him the right to do so.’24 
The fact that the gulf between natural philosophy and mathematics remained 
wide even for the succeeding generation of Copernican astronomers can be seen in the 
fact that the prime movers in establishing the truth of the Copernican astronomy (prime 
movers at least in the judgement of history) all turn to causal explanations as to how the 
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Earth moves, and do not assume that the mathematics can speak for itself. In this they 
differed from Copernicus himself, who famously wrote that mathematics is written for 
mathematicians.
25
 Effectively Copernicus simply hoped that what might be called the 
mathematical aesthetics of his system would carry the day. He hoped that the fact that 
his system provided a unique and fixed order of the planets which is entirely compatible 
with the orbital periods of the planets (unlike the Ptolemaic system, in which the order 
of the planets was only conventional) would persuade his readers of the physical truth of 
his system.
26
 But such hopes were only realistic, and Copernicus knew it, if his readers 
were mathematicians—only they could see the point. Kepler was not content to speak 
only to mathematicians, however, and so the full title of his Astronomia nova 
announced that it was an astronomy based on causes (astronomia aitiologetos), or a 
celestial physics (physica coelestis).
27
 Whether any non-mathematicians were tempted 
to take a look at Kepler’s book remains doubtful, but Galileo moved almost entirely 
away from mathematics in his attempts to establish the truth of Copernican theory. He 
presented the observations he made with the telescope as powerful circumstantial 
evidence in favour of the Copernican theory, and in his Dialogue on the Two Chief 
World Systems he developed a whole new natural philosophical theory of motion to 
show how the Earth could be in perpetual circular motion, and presented his explanation 
of the tides to argue that it must be in motion.
28
 
This brings us, by way of contrast, to Harriot. When Harriot looked at the moon 
through the telescope he had made, he drew what he saw—just as Galileo was to do 
some months later. Unlike Galileo, however, he did not set down in writing what he 
made of this; he did not discuss what general conclusions might be drawn from what he 
saw, much less tell us what conclusions, if any, he drew from his conclusions. Similarly, 
he meticulously recorded his observations of sunspots, but he made no pronouncements 
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upon them. His records indicate that he thought of them as spots on the surface of the 
Sun. He did not make the same mistake as the Jesuit astronomer, Christoph Scheiner, 
who assumed they must indicate a planet (or planets) circling the Sun inside the orbit of 
Mercury. Evidently Harriot could tell by the way the spots clustered, their sometimes 
ragged appearance, and the way they appeared and disappeared, that they were not 
planets.
29
 But whether he ever gave any thought to the fact that these spots undermined 
the Aristotelian claim that the heavens are perfect and unchanging, we simply do not 
know. Not only did Harriot not write an English Siderius nuncius, or a Letter on 
Sunspots, as far as we can tell he didn’t even make any private notes about these things 
to accompany his records of his observations. If he thought anything, he either kept 
those thoughts to himself, or was content merely to discuss them with his immediate 
companions.
30
 
It is almost as though Harriot had his own Osiander inside his head, a voice of 
conscience which told him that, as an astronomer he did not have the ability to draw 
conclusions in natural philosophy, and therefore he had no right to try to do so.
31
 
It may be useful to consider another illustration, which shows on the one hand 
the continuing gulf between mathematical and natural philosophical work, and on the 
other the kind of innovatory work Harriot might have done, but did not. This illustration 
is based on the discovery of magnetic dip or declination, discovered by the retired 
mariner, turned compass-maker, Robert Norman, and published by him in 1581 in his 
Newe Attractive. Norman seems to have been aware of the phenomenon of declination 
for a while, but only paid attention to it when it caused him to ruin one of his compass 
needles. He had noted that a perfectly balanced iron needle, would no longer remain 
horizontal (as though balanced) on its pivot, after it had been magnetised by rubbing 
with a lodestone. The needle would now dip down towards the north, as though it were 
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heavier at that end. Routinely, he would shave off some iron from the north pole of the 
magnetised needle to restore it to the horizontal. He was moved to investigate this 
further when, on one occasion, he took too much weight off the end of a particularly 
large commissioned needle and so, ‘stroken into some choler’, had to start again with 
another piece of iron.  
Norman took advice on how to proceed in his investigations from ‘certaine 
learned and expert men’: 
I applied my self to seeke further into this effect, and makyng certaine learned 
and expert men, my freendes, acquainted in this matter, they advised me to 
frame some Instrument, to make some exacte triall, how much the Needle 
touched with the Stone would Decline, or what greatest Angle it would make 
with the plane of the Horizon. Whereupon I made diligent proofes, the maner 
whereof is shewed in the Chapter followyng.
32
 
Now, it seems to me that these expert friends must have been mathematical 
practitioners, rather than natural philosophers. I base this judgment not simply on the 
surely undeniable fact that Norman was much more likely to know mathematical 
practitioners of various stamps than he was to know any natural philosophers. I also 
base it on the nature of the trials he was advised to make. The emphasis is all upon 
measuring aspects of the needle’s behaviour. Norman is not advised to make 
exploratory experiments, but ‘exacte triall[s]’. He is advised to try to determine by how 
much the needle declines, not why it does so. When Norman followed this advice he 
was able to come up with a new navigational instrument, the dip circle, which would 
reveal a ship’s latitude even under cloudy skies, when no heavenly bodies were visible. 
What he did not come up with was a natural philosophical explanation, in causal terms, 
of why this phenomenon took place.
33
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Just this kind of natural philosophical explanation for this phenomenon was 
provided in 1600 by William Gilbert in his famous work of experimental physics, De 
magnete. We don’t know when Gilbert became aware of Norman’s work but at some 
point he seized upon it and made it the starting point of a new system of natural 
philosophy. Gilbert saw that the dip of the needle was due to the fact that the magnetic 
pole of the needle was pointing directly to the magnetic pole of the Earth, not, as was 
previously held, to the pole star in the heavens. Pointing directly to the magnetic pole, 
the needle pointed down below the horizon, through the earth itself. He surmised that at 
the magnetic pole the needle would point straight down, vertically into the Earth, at the 
equator, the needle would hang horizontally on its pivot. He was then able to 
demonstrate that this is precisely what happened when a small magnetic needle was 
suspended above different parts of the surface of a spherical magnet (a terrella, as 
Gilbert called them). It followed from this that the Earth itself was a giant spherical 
magnet. From here, Gilbert was able to go on to use the magnetic nature of the Earth to 
argue for its perpetual circular motions, as demanded by Copernican astronomy.
34
 
It seems to me that Norman and Gilbert were two completely different kinds of 
thinker. Norman was concerned only to know how to put to pragmatic use the 
phenomenon that he accidentally discovered. His idea of investigating the phenomenon 
of magnetic declination seemed to consist merely in confirming that it was real and then 
taking stock of its precise behaviour in order to see how it might be put to use—this 
enterprise was ultimately embodied in the fact that he invented a new instrument to 
measure the phenomenon. Gilbert, by contrast, seized on magnetic dip precisely 
because he saw how it could be used to support Copernican astronomy, by pointing the 
way towards a causal account of how the Earth could maintain itself in perpetual 
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motion. Gilbert’s new natural philosophy was innovatory in its content, but it was 
entirely traditional in its concern to offer causal explanations.
35
 
Comparisons are odious, but if we had to compare Harriot with one of these two 
magnetic experimenters, it seems to me that we would have to count him as closer to 
Norman than to Gilbert. Harriot’s experiments, in whatever area, all seem to have been, 
like Norman’s, in the nature of ‘exacte triall[s]’, to take measurements, and to carefully 
record changes. There is no evidence that he ever did an experiment to test, or to 
demonstrate, a putative theoretical explanation of the nature of the world.  
 
Thomas Harriot: mathematician but no natural philosopher 
I believe it is Harriot’s refusal to enter the natural philosophy stakes which lies behind 
the frustration and disappointment which scholars of Harriot often feel the need to 
express. Whether it be John Shirley commenting on his alchemy (‘nowhere does he 
indicate why he is doing what he is doing, and nowhere does he give any conclusion as 
to what he has found or failed to find’), John North commenting on his observations on 
sunspots (‘He left no explanations of the phenomena he so painstakingly recorded, and 
for this reason he simply cnnot be compared in historical terms with Galileo…’), or 
some other student of Harriot commenting on other aspects of his work (‘Harriot 
himself left no ordered and coherent body of philosophical speculation’), there is no 
shortage of expressions of frustration and exasperation with Harriot.
36
 
As Jim Bennett has pointed out, however, the fault is ours, not Harriot’s. Harriot 
could not have foreseen our historiographical preoccupations, and may not have wished 
to pander to them if he had.
37
 And yet, there has been a strong tendency among Harriot 
scholars to assume that if he wasn’t the English Galileo he should have been! Jean 
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Jacquot, for example, seemed to want to imply that Harriot did try to reform natural 
philosophy (like Galileo) but that evidence of his efforts has been lost:  
Considering the scope and originality of his research, one may wonder to what 
extent he felt the need of a new philosophy to replace the old, and to what extent 
he was able to shape its elements into a coherent pattern. Unfortunately the 
evidence to be found in his writings is fragmentary.
38
 
This attitude is often held to have been summed up by his friend Sir William Lower: 
Do you not here startle, to see every day some of your inventions taken from 
you; for I remember long since you told me as much, that the motions of the 
lanets were not perfect circles. So you taught me the curious way to observe 
weight in Water, and within a while after Ghetaldi comes out with it, in print. a 
little before Vieta prevented you of the Gharland for the great Invention of 
Algebra. al these were your dues and manie others that I could mention; and yet 
too great reservednesse hath robd you of these glories… Onlie let this remember 
you, that it is possible by too much procrastination to be prevented in the honour 
of some of your rarest inventions and speculations. Let your Countrie and 
friends injoye the comforts they would have in the true and great honour you 
would purchase your selfe by publishing some of your choise works.
39
 
This was written in February 1610 and so it is all too easy to imagine Lower 
being startled once again soon after when Galileo’s Siderius Nuncius hit the bookstands, 
and again when the Letters on Sunspots appeared. Accordingly, there has been a 
tendency to read this passage as an implicit foreshadowing of the claim that Harriot 
could have been the English Galileo. But this is to read too much into Lower’s words. 
He was almost certainly only concerned that Harriot did not establish his priority, and so 
a lasting fame (for himself and for his country). There is nothing here to suggest that 
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Lower had already seen in Harriot’s work intimations of a new natural philosophy. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in subsequent correspondence to suggest that he saw this 
subsequently. 
This is instructive. After all, Lower had actually been present at Syon House, in 
December 1610, observing side by side with Harriot, when Harriot discovered sunspots. 
When reporting this in his biography of Harriot, John W. Shirley could not refrain from 
imaginatively reconstructing their excitement: 
To see actual imperfections in a celestial body ostensibly composed of the 
perfect quintessence of extra-terrestrial bodies was an almost unbelievable 
experience… [T]he Syon Philosophers shared the excitement of a discovery 
which, of itself, spelled the doom of the doctrines of the perfection of the 
quintessence, or circular motion, cycles, and epicycles; and by showing the 
imperfections of a heavenly body showed the way for acceptance of more 
material explanations of the operation of the universe.
40
 
It is very easy to see why Professor Shirley wrote this way. To those of us who 
have ever undertaken a formal course in the history of science, the really astonishing 
thing about Harriot’s discovery of sunspots is that it did not elicit the kind of response 
that Shirley describes—if what we were told in class is true, then surely Harriot had to 
be excited at seeing the doom of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Once again we are 
frustrated to find Harriot merely recording his observations of sunspots without making 
any significant comment about their significance. What are we to make of this? Is it 
merely the result of Harriot’s ‘internal Osiander’, telling him that, as an astronomer he 
has no ability as a natural philosopher, and therefore no right to speculate like one? 
Clearly, Shirley was wrong to say that the discovery of sunspots ‘of itself’ 
showed the way to a new theory of the cosmos. The discovery evidently required a 
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Galileo, a mathematician and philosopher, to show contemporaries what it implied. But 
Harriot’s failure to make of sunspots what Galileo did still seems genuinely surprising. 
But once again, perhaps the fault is ours, not Harriot’s. 
It is possible, after all, to understand why Harriot might not have been as excited 
as the standard historiographies lead us to suppose that he should have been. We simply 
have to remind ourselves that it was way back in 1572, shortly after Harriot’s birth, that 
Tycho Brahe had famously seen a new star burning so brightly in the sky that it could be 
seen even in daylight.
41
 Having established by its lack of parallax that this was indeed a 
new star, and not simply an atmospheric effect, Tycho went on to scrutinise comets in 
the same way and established that they too gave the lie to the Aristotelian belief that the 
heavens were unchanging.
42
 Even Jesuit astronomers at the Collegio Romano, 
including Christopher Clavius, conceded that there must be similarities between 
superlunary and sublunary bodies on the grounds that they do undergo change.
43
 Harriot 
the astronomer grew up, therefore, in a world where the heavens were not perfect and 
unchanging, and must have learned simply to dismiss Aristotelian doctrine on this 
matter as an irrelevance. We also know that he was one of the very first true 
Copernicans, who accepted the physical truth of the motion of the Earth. We can add to 
this the fact that Harriot probably knew of William Gilbert’s map of the moon, which 
Gilbert included in his unpublished De mundo.
44
 It is not clear whether Gilbert used a 
telescope to make his moon map, but when Harriot subsequently came to make his own 
map with the help of a telescope, he would not have been surprised to see the moon 
looking like an earthly body, rather than as a glowing disc, or sphere, of unchanging 
quintessence. (Indeed, he surely would have been surprised if he’d seen anything but an 
earthly-looking moon).
45
 In view of all this, it seems reasonable to suppose that when 
Harriot saw sunspots he saw them merely as further evidence for the already 
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well-established changeability of the heavens. Presumably, it simply never occurred to 
him that anything more needed to be said. After all, even Galileo did not publish on the 
sunspots he had observed until after the Jesuit astronomer, Christoph Scheiner, had tried 
to save the unchanging perfection of the sun by claiming the spots were really satellites 
orbiting the sun.
46
 In short, Harriot responded to sunspots not as we might have 
expected a natural philosopher to do, but as an astronomer and mathematician.  
It seems to me, furthermore, that we must take the same line with all the many 
different aspects of Harriot’s work. He was always thinking as a mathematician: 
seeking to make measurements,, to establish certainties and proofs, and to find 
pragmatic ends. He was much less concerned, if at all, with providing the kind of 
explanations in terms of causal narratives that were demanded by natural philosophers. 
However it may look to us with hindsight distorted by our preoccupations, there was 
nothing in any of his studies that inevitably had to lead him into making a major revision 
of traditional natural philosophy. And that being so, we cannot take him to task for 
failing to turn himself from a brilliantly gifted mathematical practitioner, into an 
innovatory natural philosopher.  
Just because we know that Descartes used his mathematical analysis of the 
rainbow as an example of the success of his philosophy in his Dioptrics, which he 
appended to his Discourse on the Method of 1637, it would be wrong to suppose that 
Harriot’s analysis of the rainbow should have led him to write an English Le monde. 
The link between Descartes’s geometrical optics and his system of mechanical 
philosophy was not direct, in the sense that one did not lead straight to the other. It was 
only once Descartes had his insight into how a mechanical system of philosophy might 
work that he was able to provide a new causal explanation of light within the terms of 
that system. He was then required to show that his new account of the nature of light 
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was compatible with geometrical optics, and in that regard he was able to use his 
analysis of the rainbow to brilliant effect.
47
 
Similarly, a study of colliding particles and their reactions does not have to lead 
to a fully-fledged system of natural philosophy. Again, we know that it did in the case of 
Descartes, but we cannot infer from that that any such study must also lead to a 
mechanical philosophy. It did not, after all, in the hands of Galileo, who originally 
wanted to include a study of impacts and forces of percussion in his Discorsi… intorno 
a due nuove scienze, although it is possible that it might have done had he been able to 
complete it.
48
 It did not do so in the case of Isaac Beeckman, even though he was 
specifically trying to develop a new system of physico-mathematical philosophy, and 
even though he came close.
49
 If mathematically-minded natural philosophers, like 
Galileo and Beeckman, could not manage it, there were plenty of less ambitious 
mathematical practitioners who were content to stay within the confines of mechanics. 
Harriot seems to have been one of these. As Jon Pepper commented on Harriot’s De 
reflexione corporum rotundorum: 
This is in keeping with Harriot’s other contributions to science, in which, in my 
view, the general position which comes through is that of a continual searching 
for the mathematicising of the physical world in whatever aspect, with little 
speculation as such being expressed.
50
 
It seems to me that the speculation is crucially important, particularly if we mean 
speculation about explanations and causes. The only evidence we have that Harriot ever 
did speculate about causes derives almost entirely from his atomism. Even here, 
however, we have to rely largely upon a second-hand source, Nathaniel Torporley’s 
critique of Harriot’s atomism.51 According to Torporley, Harriot used atomistic 
precepts to explain three major phenomena: condensation and rarefaction, the refraction 
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of light, and specific gravities. There is no reason to doubt Torporley’s account; his 
claim about the refraction of light is even confirmed by Harriot himself, though only 
briefly, in a letter to Kepler.
52
 So, on the face of it, this seems to provide us with clear 
evidence that Harriot was willing to play the natural philosopher sometimes.  
We are still left in the dark, however, about the extent of Harriot’s willingness to 
play this role. Torporley’s Synopsis of the Controversie of Atoms, corresponds to no 
known document written by Harriot himself. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that it 
represents Torporley’s written account of his response to Harriot in what was nothing 
more than a debate between the two friends in front of other friends. The controversy 
mentioned in Torporley’s title is certainly compatible with a debate carried out on a 
single occasion.
53
 What’s more, I find it hard to imagine what Harriot could have said in 
response to what Torporley calls his ‘squadrons’ in the battle against Harriot. We need 
not pursue these arguments here, but suffice it to say that they raised long-standing 
objections to atomism which would not be overcome until Newton introduced attractive 
and repulsive forces operating between the atoms.
54
 If ‘the controversie of atoms’ was a 
specific debate held between Harriot and Torporley, it seems likely that Torporley 
would have won. If, on the other hand, ‘the controversie’ represented a long standing 
difference of opinion between the two men, it is still hard to believe that Harriot could 
have had much confidence in his own position in the face of Torporley’s squadrons.  
Furthermore, if we add to this the evidence provided by Harriot’s papers 
discussing ‘infinites’ (in which we must include what would later be called 
infinitesimals), the papers entitled De infinitis, it seems hard to imagine that Harriot 
could have developed confidence in natural philosophising by drawing upon atomism. 
Again, we cannot review all the arguments here, but suffice it to say that Harriot was led 
by his mathematical approach to assume that atoms are indivisible by virtue of being 
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indivisibly small, that is to say, geometrical points. As Aristotle had long-since pointed 
out, however, that kind of mathematical atom cannot be used to compose physical 
entities. If physical bodies are to be composed of atoms, the atoms must have 
dimensions, and so their indivisibility must be defined in ways which are incompatible 
with geometrical demands for infinite divisibility.
55
 The evidence suggests, then, that 
Harriot might have tried his hand as a natural philosopher using atomism as his 
explanatory system, but evidence of internal difficulties, and the lack of any signs of 
development of a fully-worked out system of atomic philosophy, strongly suggest that 
Harriot found such speculation a frustrating experience—one from which he was 
perhaps glad to retreat while committing himself instead to the certainties of 
mathematics.  
It might be said that although my arguments against Harriot turning his 
geometrical optics into a system of natural philosophy, or his theory of impacts, or his 
atomism into a system of natural philosophy, work individually and in isolation from 
everything else he did; when taken together, these things surely point to a thinker 
engaged in developing an innovatory system of natural philosophy. Such an argument 
seems to amount to claiming that Harriot was the English Descartes. The argument 
would seem to run like this: we know that geometrical optics, the mechanics of colliding 
bodies, and a matter theory that was closely modelled on atomism, all contributed to 
Descartes’s mechanical philosophy, and since we also know that Harriot was involved 
in these same three projects, he was clearly also involved (before Descartes!) in trying 
to develop a new system of mechanical philosophy.
56
 The hidden premise in such an 
argument is that the mechanical philosophy follows implicitly from the mere 
combination of geometrical optics, the mechanics of colliding bodies, and corpuscular 
matter theory. But this is simply to denigrate Descartes’s achievement. This is not the 
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place to try to reconstruct how Descartes arrived at his system of mechanical 
philosophy, but it certainly did not simply become apparent to him as a result of his 
pursuing these separate strands of thought in parallel. The mechanical philosophy was 
forged out of these separate strands but in a way that revealed that a unique intellect of 
great genius was at work.
57
 To cite just one example, Descartes’s corpuscular matter 
theory enabled him to adopt aspects of atomism which were highly useful in physical 
explanation, but by denying that the invisibly small particles of matter as he conceived 
them were indivisible he avoided the insurmountable pitfalls that Torporley’s squadrons 
raised against Harriot’s atomism. Harriot was very definitely not the English 
Descartes.
58
 
I see Harriot, therefore, as one of the contributors to the mathematisation of the 
world picture, and to the introduction of experimental techniques, and of mathematical 
instruments, which went hand-in-hand with that mathematising process; all of which 
has been brilliantly described by Jim Bennett and others in recent years.
59
 The rise of 
the mathematical practitioner, intellectually and socially, is undeniably of crucial 
importance for understanding the Scientific Revolution, and in this I entirely agree with 
Jim Bennett, but it should not be forgotten that, as Bennett himself points out, crucial 
stages in the development of the mechanical philosophy were ‘represented by the 
powerful formulations of individual thinkers’.60 Those individual thinkers needed to be 
natural philosophers as well as mathematicians. Where Dr Bennett, quite justifiably, 
wants to emphasise the role of what he calls the mechanics’ philosophy, I want to 
suggest that to progress from the mechanics’ philosophy to the mechanical philosophy, 
the mechanics needed middle men, men who were not just mathematicians, but who 
were, like Galileo, and like Descartes, mathematicians and philosophers. These were 
the men who recognised the importance of causal explanation as it was emphasised in 
 24 
the Aristotelian tradition, and who sought to add physical explanations to otherwise 
purely mathematical accounts.
61
 
It seems to me that only a small handful of thinkers succeeded in combining 
these two approaches—chief among whom were Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, but there 
were others. We must exclude Harriot from that list, however, on the grounds that his 
work did not provide the putative causal explanations required for it to count as natural 
philosophy. There is no need to be ashamed on Harriot’s behalf, he was working after 
all at a time when the separation between natural philosophy and the mixed 
mathematical sciences was still wide. Even in 1638, when Louis Elzevir published 
Galileo’s Discourses he was using a title chosen by himself. We do not know what title 
Galileo gave to his last great work but we do know that he regretted Elzevir’s choice of 
‘a low and common title for the noble and dignified one carried upon the title-page’. In 
publishing it under the title, Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations concerning 
Two New Sciences pertaining to Mechanics and Local Motions, it would seem that 
Elzevir was playing a similar role to Osiander when he added his apologetic preface to 
Copernicus’s De revolutionibus, warning Galileo’s readers that this was a book on 
mathematics. It seems reasonable to assume that Galileo’s more ‘noble and dignified’ 
title gave the impression it was a work of natural philosophy. Clearly, Elzevir did not 
see it that way, and felt that his readers would not.
62
 
It is also worth remembering that even as late as 1687 the title of Isaac Newton’s 
great book struck contemporaries as puzzling and unfamiliar. To speak of the 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, was to bring together two intellectual 
approaches that still seemed very different and widely separated from one another, as 
far as most educated readers were concerned. What’s more, even Leibniz (the German 
Newton?) objected to what he saw as a lacuna in Newton’s natural philosophy, when 
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Newton failed to provide a properly causal account of the operation of gravity. As is 
well known, Newton did not respond by providing one, but by invoking the certainty of 
the mathematical approach: ‘it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to 
the laws that we have set forth’.63 On this occasion, therefore, Newton exploited the 
lingering division between mathematics and natural philosophy to defend his nescient 
position on the nature of gravity. This is the kind of response, mutatis mutandis, that 
Copernicus might have given in 1543 if someone had pointed out that he did not explain 
how the Earth moves.
64
 
Given that the separation between mathematics and natural philosophy was still 
so wide, it is hardly surprising that a consummate mathematician like Harriot (surely the 
superior of Galileo in this regard) should decide to stick to his practice, as a cobbler 
sticks to his last. After all, Harriot could not have known that the future lay with an as 
yet undreamed of mechanical philosophy, which would be the triumphant result of a 
combination of the mathematical approach with a natural philosophy that still offered a 
causal narrative about the way the world worked. It seems much more likely that Harriot 
would still have seen mathematics and natural philosophy as separate and distinct 
enterprises. This being so, it is highly likely that he would have believed that the future 
belonged to mathematical practitioners, and that natural philosophy could only lead to 
dead ends.
65
 
Accordingly, I do not think that we have to suppose that Harriot carried around 
with him an ‘internal Osiander’, a voice of conscience telling him that as a 
mathematician he was unsuited for philosophising.
66
 I believe that even the little that we 
do know about Harriot’s atomistic speculations is enough to indicate that he was willing 
to try his hand at natural philosophy, if he thought it would help. The fact that he did not 
pursue atomism, but evidently turned back instead to the certainties of the mathematical 
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approach is not a sign of failure, or of diffidence, but of an uncompromising 
perfectionism. Harriot compares very favourably here with Galileo and Descartes, both 
of whom seem to have been astonishingly blind to the obvious failings of their 
philosophical speculations.  
Although Galileo’s theory of the tides can be said to show a powerful intuition 
about the role of oscillatory systems in tidal phenomena, that intuition went far beyond 
the bounds of his astronomy, his physics, his experimental method, and his 
mathematics.
67
 Consequently, the tidal theory, upon which he pinned so much, stood 
out for his contemporaries as an embarrassing absurdity in his physics. Moreover, the 
fact that his attempt to explain the perpetual motion of the Earth and the other planets 
depended upon the assumption that the planets move in perfect circles with uniform 
circular motions, seems wilfully dismissive of the demands of astronomy. The whole 
history of astronomy since the Ancient Greeks had been an attempt to reconcile the 
belief in uniform circular motions with the all too obvious observations which 
unavoidably suggest that the planets do not move uniformly, nor homocentrically. 
Galileo’s argument for the motion of the Earth in terms of a perpetual uniform motion 
on a flat frictionless plane that, unlike a sloping plane, affords no reason for the Earth to 
accelerate or decelerate, is ingenious to be sure. But once the reader realises that the 
‘flat’ plane which neither approaches nor recedes from the Sun is in fact a sphere around 
the Sun, and the Earth’s unceasing motion is therefore proved in terms of its uniform 
circular motion around the Sun, incredulity sets in. It is impossible to read the relevant 
parts of the Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems without wondering whether 
Galileo is really serious in developing an argument which does not simply fail to fulfil 
the Platonic injunction to ‘save the phenomena’ revealed by astronomy, but egregiously 
ignores them!
68
 Similarly, the Cartesian system, for all its breath-taking ingenuity, was 
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shot through with insurmountable difficulties. Its insistence that there could be no new 
motions in the world, for example, only the transfer of motion from one part of the 
system of the world to another. And the concept of vortexes, as Newton later spelled 
out, was ‘beset with many difficulties’.69  
We now know, of course, that the failures of Galileo and Descartes were 
magnificent failures, providing important stages on the way to our modern 
understanding of the physical world. But their immediate contemporaries could not 
have known this, much less a thinker like Harriot, who did not live to see the direction 
that Galileo and Descartes took in their major publications. If Harriot had tried to be a 
pioneer in combining mathematical approaches with a causal natural philosophy, it is 
hard to believe that he could have done any better than Descartes. It is likely that his 
own putative system of natural philosophy, whatever it might have been, would also 
have proved inadequate (as for example that of his fellow ‘magus’, Walter Warner 
did).
70
 It seems clear, however, that Harriot never did try to develop a new 
philosophy—he was perhaps too clever, or too self-critical, to indulge in self-deceiving 
philosophising. Throughout his career he concentrated instead on ‘exacte trialls’ and 
other more restricted, but more certain, mathematical approaches, perhaps hoping that 
new understanding would emerge from the certainties of mathematics. 
If he did hold out such hopes for mathematics, rather than for philosophical 
speculation, he could hardly be said to be deluded. Developments in mathematics 
during the first two decades of the seventeenth century were arguably more exciting, 
and potentially fruitful, than developments in natural philosophy. Furthermore, it was at 
just this time, let us not forget, that Harriot’s great contemporary, Francis Bacon, was 
also discouraging speculation in philosophy, and advocating instead a careful gathering 
of accurate and reliable information about natural phenomena. Harriot’s eschewing of 
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philosophical speculation, so regretted by his modern commentators, was in his day by 
no means a methodologically unjustifiable position.
71
 
 
In conclusion, I want to say that, in spite of the epitaph on Harriot’s monument, where 
he was described as excelling in mathematics, natural philosophy and theology, he was 
no more a natural philosopher than he was a theologian, and for that reason he should 
not be seen as the English Galileo.
72
 Furthermore, I believe that he concentrated almost 
exclusively on mathematics as a matter of personal choice and preference. Although it 
might be said that in the early part of his career, when he was retained by Walter Ralegh, 
he had no choice but to pursue the entirely pragmatic ends of his patron, this was not the 
case during the years that he was the pensioner of Henry Percy. As Stephen Pumfrey has 
pointed out, ‘Northumberland was unique in patronizing natural philosophy as well as 
utility’, and we know that Walter Warner must have spent much of his time developing 
the new system of natural philosophy which can be seen in his manuscript remains.
73
 
Harriot could have pursued natural philosophy if he had wanted to, but judging from his 
own manuscript remains he never did.
74
 It is impossible to know whether Harriot 
rejected the natural philosophical approach out of diffidence, brought on by his own 
‘internal Osiander’, telling him that as a mathematician he was unsuited for philosophy; 
or as a result of a perfectionism which he felt he could achieve through mathematics, but 
not through the much less certain speculations of physics. Either way, Harriot was not 
the English Galileo. 
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